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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10342Except for Social Security and, for some, employer-provided pension as-
sets, housing equity is the most important asset of a large fraction of older
Americans. In principle, these assets might be used to support consump-
tion after retirement. In this paper we take another look at the change in
the home equity of older families as they age, beginning at ages just before
retirement. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the
Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey, as
well as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). We dis-
tinguish changes in housing equity that might be thought of as part of a ﬁ-
nancial plan to use housing equity as a means of general support in retire-
ment from changes in housing equity that are precipitated by family
shocks—death or severe illness.
This paper extends the analysis in Venti and Wise (2001), in which we
found that in the absence of changes in household structure, most elderly
families are unlikely to move.1 We also found that even among movers,
those families that continue to own typically do not reduce home equity.
However, precipitating shocks, like the death of a spouse or entry into a
nursing home, sometimes lead to liquidation of home equity. Home equity
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1. The AHEAD initially surveyed persons aged seventy and over in 1993 and resurveyed
them in 1995 as part of the second wave of AHEAD and resurveyed them again in 1998 as
part of the fourth wave of the HRS. For convenience we refer to these surveys as the ﬁrst three
waves of AHEAD.is typically not liquidated to support general nonhousing consumption
needs. The analysis in the current paper is also based on both the HRS and
AHEAD data, as well as data from eight panels of the SIPP. Again, the key
question is whether housing wealth is typically used to support the general
consumption of older persons as they age, although the analysis is based
on more extensive data. The present analysis also presents a more formal
accounting for the change in home equity when ownership is discontinued
and the change in home equity when moving to another owned unit (“up-
sizing” or “downsizing”). In addition, we give brief consideration to par-
allel changes in nonhousing assets as persons age.
The change in housing equity as persons age has been considered in sev-
eral earlier papers, using data that covered an earlier time period or data
for persons at younger ages. In Venti and Wise (1989, 1990), we concluded
that households don’t want to reduce housing equity as they age. We found
that large reductions in home equity were typically associated with the
death of a spouse, retirement, or with other precipitating shocks. These
analyses were based on the Retirement History Survey (RHS) and covered
persons in the ﬁfty-eight to seventy-three age range. Merrill (1984), basing
her ﬁndings on the Retirement History Survey (RHS), found that unless
there was a change in family status there was little if any reduction in hous-
ing equity as families aged. Feinstein and McFadden (1989), basing their
ﬁndings on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), including house-
holds with heads over age seventy-ﬁve, also concluded that in the absence
of change in family status housing equity was typically not reduced. Meg-
bolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling (1997) also used the PSID and found that
the change in housing equity varied by age. The oldest households (age
seventy-ﬁve-plus) were as likely to trade up as to trade down when they
moved. Sheiner and Weil (1993) found some decline in home equity at older
ages, but these declines were primarily associated with shocks to family sta-
tus and health. Hurd (1999), in a general analysis of wealth change based
on the ﬁrst two waves of the AHEAD, concluded that there was a modest
decline in housing wealth and rates of home ownership for two-person
households that survived the two-year period intact, but larger declines for
two-person households that lost a member between the waves. He also
found that total wealth increased between the waves for all types of house-
holds and at all ages.
Whether the elderly perceive home equity as a source of funds for gen-
eral consumption as they grow older is an important issue for at least two
reasons. A concern of some is that older households have substantial
wealth locked in illiquid housing and would like to release it. A proposed
solution to this perceived problem is a reverse annuity mortgage that al-
lows the household to draw down home equity while remaining in the
home. To date, there has been little apparent interest in reverse mortgages.
It is not clear whether the failure is due to unfavorable ﬁnancial terms of
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tended to exhaust housing equity over the life of the occupant. Several
studies, including Venti and Wise (1991), Mayer and Simons (1994), and
Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty (1994), have shown that a signiﬁcant segment of
the population appears to be “income-poor and house-rich” and might
beneﬁt from a reverse mortgage. We concluded in our earlier analyses,
however, that the equity choices of older persons were inconsistent with
substantial interest in such products. Nonetheless, knowing whether older
households wish to withdraw assets from housing equity helps to evaluate
the extent of the potential market for reverse mortgages, and we judge it
important to revisit the issue.
A second reason to consider whether the elderly plan to, or will, use
home equity to support general consumption is to understand the ade-
quacy of saving for retirement. If housing equity is used just like ﬁnancial
assets to support consumption after retirement, then it might also be con-
sidered as a substitute for ﬁnancial wealth and perhaps treated inter-
changeably with ﬁnancial wealth in considering the well-being of the el-
derly. On the other hand, if households do not plan to draw down home
equity as they age, it may be more realistic to assume that general con-
sumption expenditures will come largely from accumulated ﬁnancial
wealth, including Social Security and other annuities. Analysts consider-
ing how well households are prepared for retirement have treated housing
equity in various ways. Moore and Mitchell (2000) include housing wealth
in the set of assets that can be used to ﬁnance retirement. The Congres-
sional Budget Oﬃce (1993) also includes housing wealth with other wealth.
On the other hand, in “Is the Baby Boom Generation Preparing Ade-
quately for Retirement,” Bernheim (1992) excluded housing wealth in mak-
ing a determination. Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) include zero percent,
50 percent, and 100 percent of housing equity. Gustman and Steinmeier
(1999) conduct analyses using zero and 100 percent of home equity.
In this paper we ﬁrst consider the relationship between age and housing
equity over the life cycle, based on data from the SIPP. This analysis is drawn
largely from Venti and Wise (2001). The results are based on cohort anal-
ysis and are presented graphically. Next, we present more detailed cohort
analysis for older households, based on the HRS and the AHEAD data.
We then focus on within-household changes in housing equity, giving
particular attention to the eﬀect of precipitating shocks. We ﬁnd that on
average there is no reduction in housing equity among persons who con-
tinue to own homes, even as they age through their eighties and even into
their nineties. Indeed, persons who sell one house and buy another tend to
increase housing equity, on average. Large reductions in housing equity are
typically associated only with selling and discontinuing home ownership.
Giving up ownership is most often associated with the death of a spouse or
entry into a nursing home. In these cases, home equity may be used to pay
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viving spouse, although we have not attempted here to document such ex-
penditures. In general, however, we ﬁnd that home equity is not systemat-
ically converted to liquid assets to support nonhousing consumption.
Finally, our analysis draws attention to two limiting features of the HRS
and AHEAD data. The ﬁrst feature concerns the use of imputations in
analysis of panel data. Our earlier analysis of the AHEAD data was based
on preliminary releases of AHEAD wave 2 and HRS wave 4 (the third wave
of AHEAD). In the current paper we use more recent releases of the sec-
ond wave of AHEAD and the fourth wave of the HRS that include asset
imputations—including home equity—provided by the HRS staﬀ.2 Tabu-
lations from the new data sources are similar to tabulations presented in
Venti and Wise (2001) that did not use these imputations. We ﬁnd, however,
that in many instances the imputations appear to increase the randomness
in the data. This is perhaps not surprising, given that imputed values are
“hot-decked,” based on contemporaneous cross-section data. In panel ap-
plications, the imputed values should be based on both family-speciﬁc lon-
gitudinal data, as well as cross-section data. In this paper, all analyses using
the “selling price” data (section 2.5 forward) drop imputed observations.
A second, related concern is the large number of inconsistent responses
in the reported data, particularly when comparing “move” and “stay” tran-
sitions to “own” and “rent” housing tenures. For example, many house-
holds are reported to own in one wave then rent in the next, and then re-
turn to ownership in the third wave, without reporting a move between
either the ﬁrst and second waves, or between the second and third waves.
Many of these households begin and end with the same (or similar) home
equity. Most of these anomalies are apparently reporting errors. Each such
error results in two changes in housing equity that are of equal magnitude
but opposite sign and thus may have a large eﬀect on calculated changes in
home equity. In some of our analyses we have dropped observations that
reported a change in tenure but did not report a move. We also ﬁnd many
unrealistically large wave-to-wave swings in home equity among house-
holds that stay in the same home. These apparent errors are comparable in
magnitude to the changes in home equity reported by movers.3
Much of the analysis in this paper is based on recent selling prices and
on the reported equity in newly purchased homes. We believe these data are
likely to be the most reliable data on home equity. We also have given con-
siderable attention to evaluating the extent of bias in self-assessed home
values. Thus, on balance, while we believe that more attention can be given
to improving the data, we are comfortable with our principal conclusions.
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2. The newer data also use additional information on death and nursing home entry that
has recently become available.
3. The HRS is currently using “callback” procedures to resolve these issues.3.1 Cohort Description
3.1.1 SIPP Data on Home Ownership and Equity over the Life Course
The SIPP provides housing equity (obtained from home value and mort-
gage debt) data for seven years—1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, and
1995. The survey panels and waves that provide the data are as follows:
Panel Wave Dates in Field
1984 4 Sept.–Dec. 1984
7 Sept.–Dec. 1985
1985 3 Sept.–Dec. 1985
7J an.–Apr. 1987
1986 4 Jan.–Apr. 1987
7J an.–Apr. 1988
1987 4 Feb.–May 1988
1990 4 Feb.–May 1991
1991 7 Feb.–May 1993
1992 4 Feb.–May 1993
1993 7 Feb.–May 1995
From the random sample of cross-section data in each of these years we
have created cohort data. For example, to trace the home equity of persons
who were aged twenty-six in 1984, we begin with the average home equity
of persons aged twenty-six, based on the random sample of persons aged
twenty-six in 1984 survey. Next we obtain the average equity of persons
aged twenty-seven from the 1985 survey, aged twenty-nine in the 1987 sur-
vey, and so forth. We identify cohorts by their age in the 1984 survey. We
do this for seventeen cohorts deﬁned by the age of the cohort in the ﬁrst
year of the data. In fact, to obtain more precise estimates of housing eq-
uity, the data for a cohort, like age twenty-six, is the average of data for a
three-year age interval—twenty-ﬁve, twenty-six, and twenty-seven. We do
this for cohorts age twenty-six, twenty-nine, . . . to age seventy-one, sev-
enty-four. All cohorts are followed until age eighty in the SIPP.4
Figure 3.1 shows the percent of two-person households who own a
home, by cohort. These data can be aﬀected by diﬀerential mortality. For
example, suppose that home owners were less likely to die at any age than
renters. In this case, the ownership rate would be increased with age simply
because the owners lived and the renters died. To account for this possi-
bility, we made a mortality correction to the data, which is explained in 
the appendix. The mortality-corrected data for two-person households is
shown in ﬁgure 3.1. To make the ﬁgure easier to read, only selected cohorts
are shown. The key message of the ﬁgure is that home ownership does not
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4. Data for households over age eighty are not used because age is top coded at eighty.decline with age, through age seventy-nine. In addition, there appear to be
no important cohort eﬀects until about age seventy. That is, there are no
large jumps when the data for one cohort ends and the data for another co-
hort begins. At older ages, however, there do appear to be noticeable co-
hort eﬀects. Home ownership is lower for the last two cohorts. But like the
trends for the other cohorts, there is no evident decline in ownership as
these cohorts age.
Home ownership data for one-person households are shown in ﬁgure
3.2. Again there is no apparent decline in ownership with age, through age
seventy-nine. Indeed, the data seem to show some increase in ownership at
the oldest ages.
Cohort home equity data for two-person families are shown in ﬁgure 3.3.
These data are in 1995 dollars and are corrected for mortality. The within-
cohort data show no decline in home equity as the cohort ages. The data
may even show some increase in equity within cohorts for ages sixty-ﬁve to
seventy-nine. There do appear to be some cohort eﬀects in equity, as evi-
denced by the jumps when the data for one cohort ends and the data for an-
other cohort begins.
In estimates reported in Venti and Wise (2001), we show rather system-
atic cohort eﬀects. The estimates show that both older cohorts—those over
age seventy in 1984, and younger cohorts—those younger than thirty-six
in 1984, have lower home equity than the average, while the middle-aged
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Fig. 3.1 Percent owning for two-person households, mortality adjusted data 
from SIPP
Source: Authors’ calculations, SIPP data.Fig. 3.2 Percent owning for one-person households, mortality adjusted data 
from SIPP
Source: Authors’ calculations, SIPP data.
Fig. 3.3 Home equity for two-person households, mortality and CPI adjusted data
from SIPP
Source: Authors’ calculations, SIPP data.cohorts have higher equity than the average. The cohort eﬀects are likely
determined in large part by diﬀerences in housing price changes over time.5
Figure 3.4 shows the cohort equity data for one-person households, cor-
rected for mortality and inﬂation. As with the two-person households,
there seems to be no decline in equity through age seventy-nine.
3.1.2 At Older Ages: HRS and AHEAD
To understand trends in home equity at older ages, we use the AHEAD
as well as the HRS. Both are panel studies. The HRS follows persons in
households with heads aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in 1992. Members of
these households were interviewed in 1992 and again in 1994, 1996, and
1998. In 1998, the heads were aged ﬁfty-seven to sixty-seven. Thus this age
range is included within the SIPP ages. The AHEAD study follows persons
in households with heads aged seventy and older in 1993. These house-
holds were interviewed in 1993 and again in 1995 and in 1998 (as part of
the fourth wave of the HRS).6 The AHEAD age range overlaps the older
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5. For example, assume that homes are bought at age thirty-ﬁve on average, and consider
the cohort that was aged ﬁfty in 1984 compared to the cohort that was aged thirty-eight in
1984. The older cohort bought homes in 1969, on average, and would have gained from large
home price increases in the 1970s. On the other hand, the younger cohort would have bought
homes in 1981, on average, and would have seen much lower increases in home equity during
the 1980s and 1990s.
6. Juster and Suzman (1995) provide details of the survey design.
Fig. 3.4 Home equity for one-person households, mortality and CPI adjusted data
from SIPP
Source: Authors’ calculations, SIPP data.SIPP ages. Thus both HRS and AHEAD allow comparison with compo-
nents of the longer life-cycle SIPP data. Details of the survey design are
presented in Juster and Suzman (1995).
In this analysis, we follow households in both the AHEAD and HRS
ﬁles. One complication is tracking households over time. A household may
split through divorce or separation, members may die, or a family member
may enter a nursing home. For the purposes of this analysis, we have
adopted these conventions: In the ﬁrst wave of each survey households are
identiﬁed as either one-person or two-person households (institutional-
ized persons are excluded from the original sample). In subsequent survey
waves we classify each household—according to the change since the prior
wave—into one of the following six “states”:
1   continuing one-person household
2   continuing two-person household
D   one of the original members has died
T   both of the original members have died
N   one or more members has entered a nursing home
S   household composition has changed for some other reason (most of-
ten a split through divorce or separation or the addition of a new adult
member)
0   household refused the interview or is missing for other reasons
The sequences observed in the HRS and AHEAD are presented in table
3.1. These sequences are used to distinguish households included in the fol-
lowing analyses. In cohort analysis in the next section we restrict attention
to continuing two-person or one-person households identiﬁed as “2222”
or “1111” for the HRS and “222” or “111” for the AHEAD. In the follow-
ing section we consider changes in housing equity and other assets between
waves. For this analysis we use each two-period sequence (creating an in-
terval), and we focus in particular on the within-household relationship
between home ownership and home equity on the one hand and change 
in household composition on the other hand. We consider cohort data on
home ownership ﬁrst. Then we consider cohort data on home equity, as
well as nonhousing net assets.
Home Ownership
To obtain cohort data comparable to the SIPP cohort data, we construct
cohorts from the HRS and AHEAD data by grouping households in two-
year age intervals. These constructed cohorts are the basis for the cohort
data shown in the following.
The home ownership cohort data for two-person families are shown in
ﬁgure 3.5, which covers ages from ﬁfty to ninety-three. To make the indi-
vidual cohort data easier to view, only selected—largely nonoverlapping—
cohorts are shown. The ﬁrst three cohorts plotted in the ﬁgure are from the
Aging and Housing Equity: Another Look 135HRS; the last ﬁve are from the AHEAD. Overall, the within-cohort data
show an increase in home ownership through age seventy. Thereafter the
cohort data suggest a small decline in ownership. A more detailed analysis
of these data, presented in the following, shows that for the AHEAD
sample the within-cohort decline in ownership for continuing two-person
households is about 0.66 percent per year for cohorts aged seventy to sev-
enty-eight in the initial year and 0.34 percent for cohorts aged eighty or
more in the initial year. A comparison of these data with the SIPP data in
ﬁgure 3.1 shows that for persons aged ﬁfty to seventy-nine the SIPP and the
HRS-AHEAD data are very similar. Both data sources show ownership
rates of about 90 percent for families over age sixty. The within-cohort SIPP
data, however, show no decline in ownership through age seventy-nine.
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Table 3.1 Household Status Sequences in the HRS and in the AHEAD/HRS
HRS AHEAD/HRS
All Group All Group
Sequence N (%) (%) Sequence N (%) (%)
2222 3,311 43.75 68.39 222 1,203 19.93 55.75
2220 225 2.97 4.65 22D 293 4.86 13.58
222D 156 2.06 3.22 220 133 2.2 6.16
222S 42 0.55 0.87 22N 33 0.55 1.53
222N 10 0.13 0.21 22T 27 0.45 1.25
2200 307 4.06 6.34 2DD 234 3.88 10.84
22DD 131 1.73 2.71 200 112 1.86 5.19
22SS 47 0.62 0.97 2DT 47 0.78 2.18
22D0 10 0.13 0.21 2ND 26 0.43 1.20
2000 377 4.98 7.79 2TT 20 0.33 0.93
2DDD 116 1.53 2.40 2D0 19 0.31 0.88
2SSS 94 1.24 1.94 2NN 11 0.18 0.51
2D00 15 0.2 0.31 Subtotal 2,158 100.00
Subtotal 4,841 100.00 111 2,217 36.74 57.70
1111 1,832 24.21 68.61 11D 405 6.71 10.54
1110 119 1.57 4.46 11N 186 3.08 4.84
111D 52 0.69 1.95 110 142 2.35 3.70
111S 12 0.16 0.45 1DD 462 7.66 12.02
111N 10 0.13 0.37 100 266 4.41 6.92
1100 179 2.37 6.70 1ND 98 1.62 2.55
11DD 69 0.91 2.58 1NN 66 1.09 1.72
11SS 10 0.13 0.37 Subtotal 3,842 100.00
1000 323 4.27 12.10 Other 35 0.6




Note: N   number of observations. See text for explanation of sequences.The pattern of home ownership for continuing one-person households,
shown in ﬁgure 3.6, is quite diﬀerent. Again, there are some cohort eﬀects.
The within-cohort data for one-person households show a distinct rise in
ownership between ages ﬁfty and seventy-ﬁve and a decline in ownership
at older ages. For AHEAD households—aged seventy and older—the
within-cohort decline for the continuing one-person AHEAD households
is a little over 1 percent per year. (The data used to produce ﬁgures 3.5 and
3.6 diﬀer in some respects from the data used in similar calculations pre-
sented in subsequent sections of the paper. First, the ﬁgures are based on
persons who were continuing one- or two-person households over all of the
survey waves. Some of the subsequent calculations are based on continu-
ing one- or two-person households between two consecutive survey waves.
Second, the ﬁgures account for both own-to-rent (or other) and rent-to-
own transitions. Rent-to-own transitions oﬀset to some extent own-to-rent
transitions. Some subsequent calculations are based only on the transi-
tions of initial homeowners. Third, a noticeable number of reported
changes in tenure are not associated with a move. We believe that most of
these changes in tenure are reporting or coding errors, as discussed in sec-
tion 3.2.1. For example, considering the AHEAD portion of ﬁgure 3.6, the
within-cohort decline in ownership for continuing one-person households
is 1.29 percent per year, using the data as reported. If households that re-
port changes in tenure without a move are not included in the calculations,
the decline is only about 0.98 percent per year. Using the latter data, home
ownership of continuing one-person households is 74.7 percent at age sev-
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Fig. 3.5 Percent owning for two-person households, data from HRS and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.enty. At an annual decline of 0.98 percent per year, 61.28 percent of these
one-person households would still be owners at age ninety.)
Home Equity
Mean home equity cohort data for two-person households are shown in
ﬁgure 3.7.7 These within-cohort data show an increase in home equity
through about age seventy or seventy-ﬁve. At older ages, the randomness
within cohorts makes it hard to see clear trends, although there appears to
be a within-cohort decline in equity. In fact, data presented below show
that the average mean decline is about $2,100 per year, which is largely ac-
counted for by the reported decline in the same-home equity of continuing
owners.
The home equity cohort data for one-person households are shown in
ﬁgure 3.8. As with the two-person households, there is a clear within-
cohort increase in home equity through age seventy or seventy-ﬁve. At
older ages a consistent within-cohort trend is not apparent. Data pre-
sented in the following show that the average decline is about $3,000 per
year, again, largely accounted for by the reported decline in the same-home
equity of continuing owners. There appear to be substantial diﬀerences in
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Fig. 3.6 Percent owning for one-person households, data from HRS and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.
7. All dollar amounts for the SIPP and AHEAD have been converted to 1998 dollars using
the consumer price index (CPI).Fig. 3.7 Mean home equity for two-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.
Fig. 3.8 Mean home equity for one-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.home equity by cohort, although the randomness in the data makes it hard
to distinguish cohort eﬀects from within-cohort changes in home equity.
Median cohort data for two- and one-person households are shown in
ﬁgures 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. There is less randomness in the median
data than in the mean data, and thus within-cohort trends are easier to dis-
cern in these ﬁgures. For example, for older two-person households the me-
dians suggest modest within-cohort decline in home equity beginning at
about age seventy-ﬁve, but cohort eﬀects are not apparent. On the other
hand, the median cohort data for older one-person households show little
within-cohort decline in home equity but rather substantial cohort eﬀects.
Older cohorts seem to have successively less home equity. In the following,
we present quantitative estimates of the within-cohort changes in home
equity.
Nonhome Equity
In considering the equity value of housing as these cohorts aged, it is in-
formative to compare the value of housing with other assets. Cohort data
on nonhousing assets are shown in ﬁgures 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14. Like
the home equity data, mean and median cohort data are shown for two-
and one-person households, and separate ﬁgures are shown for the older
AHEAD households. As with the home equity data, the trend in the non-
home equity data for the HRS households is quite clear. But the extent of
randomness in the data makes the cohort data for the AHEAD households
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Fig. 3.9 Median home equity for two-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.Fig. 3.10 Median home equity for one-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.
Fig. 3.11 Mean nonhousing equity for two-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.Fig. 3.12 Mean nonhousing equity for one-person households, data from HRS 
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.
Fig. 3.13 Median nonhousing equity for two-person households, data from HRS
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.much harder to interpret. Nonetheless, some trends are clear from the co-
hort data. (In the following we show quantitative within-cohort changes in
nonhome assets, as well as home equity.)
First, it is clear for the HRS households that both home equity and hous-
ing increased with age, but the nonhousing assets increased much more.
For example, from ﬁgure 3.7 it can be seen that the mean home equity of
continuing two-person households increased from about $80,000 at age
ﬁfty to about $120,000 for households in their early seventies. There seem
to be no apparent cohort eﬀects. In ﬁgure 3.11, it can be seen that non-
housing assets of the HRS households increased from about $200,000 at
age ﬁfty to close to $400,000 at age seventy-four, about ﬁve times as much
as the increase in home equity. Again, cohort eﬀects are not apparent in
this age range. In future analysis we will try to determine which compo-
nents of nonequity assets account for the large increase.
Second, for the older HRS households there are also large within-cohort
increases in nonequity assets. For the older households, however, there are
also large cohort eﬀects, with successively older cohorts having lower non-
housing assets. And, for the older cohorts there is some within-cohort de-
cline in home equity.
It may be that there are in fact very large wave to wave changes in both
home equity and nonhousing assets. We believe, however, that the data is
likely to reﬂect substantial reporting or recording errors. Thus further ver-
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Fig. 3.14 Median nonhousing equity for one-person households, data from HRS
and AHEAD
Source: Authors’ calculations, HRS and AHEAD data.iﬁcation and “cleaning” of the data—including callbacks to correct retro-
spective information—might result in more consistent cohort patterns.
These steps would have to be based on joint evaluation of all assets over all
waves of the HRS and AHEAD surveys—looking perhaps at a X   Y ma-
trix of data for each household.
3.2 Family Status and Home Equity: HRS and AHEAD
We now turn to the relationship between changes in home equity and
changes in family structure. Again we consider two- and one-person
households separately and provide separate estimates for the HRS and the
AHEAD families. Before considering within-cohort household transi-
tions, cross-section summary data on household tenure (own, or rent, or
other combined) are shown by age and household structure (one-person or
two-person) in table 3.2. Home ownership of two-person families exceeds
90 percent between ages ﬁfty-four and seventy-four and then declines to
around 80 percent at ages eighty-ﬁve and older. For one-person families,
home ownership increases to about 68 percent for households aged seventy
to seventy-four and then declines to about 50 percent for households aged
eighty-ﬁve and older. The home ownership rate for one-person households
peaks in the seventy to seventy-four age range, declines modestly over the
next decade, then falls sharply after age eighty-four.
3.2.1 Within-Household Transitions
We focus on the events that precipitate changes in home ownership and
the changes in home equity that are associated with the ownership changes.
Table 3.3 shows ownership transitions between consecutive survey waves
(an “interval”). The ﬁrst two panels of the table pertain to households that
owned a home at the beginning of the interval. The third and fourth pan-
els pertains to households that did not own a home at the beginning of the
interval. The table entries show the percent of households who make a
144 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
Table 3.2 Percent Own, Rent, and Other, by Age (from wave 1 of the HRS and
wave 1 of the AHEAD)
One-Person Households Two-Person Households
Age Own Rent Other Own Rent Other
51–53 58.3 34.0 7.7 87.7 10.8 1.5
54–56 54.5 37.0 8.4 90.9 7.7 1.4
57–61 62.5 29.5 8.0 90.5 7.1 2.4
70–74 67.5 22.8 9.8 91.1 7.0 1.9
75–79 64.0 25.6 10.3 87.8 8.6 3.7
80–84 60.3 25.3 14.4 81.1 12.8 6.0
85  48.4 31.8 19.9 78.7 15.1 6.2Table 3.3 Tenure Transitions, by Initial Tenure and by Change in Household Status
(for HRS and AHEAD households, in percent)
Change in  Subsequent
Household Status Tenure Period Status (%) % Move N
Initial Homeowners in the HRS
22 Own 98.3 7.1 9,173
Rent or other 1.7 65.7 165
2D Own 95.6 8.4 316
Rent or other 4.4 55.6 13
2N Own 88.6 18.9 12
Rent or other 11.4 0 1
11 Own 95.2 6.1 3,150
Rent or other 4.8 54.5 169
1N Own 100 0 3
Rent or other 0 0
Initial Homeowners in the AHEAD
22 Own 96.9 3.9 2,332
Rent or other 3.1 38.5 75
2D Own 88.8 9.4 358
Rent or other 11.2 76.1 51
2N Own 75 6.4 35
Rent or other 25 79.9 14
11 Own 91.3 4.5 2,841
Rent or other 8.7 47.2 269
1N Own 39.9 0 57
Rent or other 60.1 92.6 79
Initial Renters in the HRS
22 Own 22.3 51.3 220
Rent or other 77.7 21.1 822
2D Own 12.4 46.8 8
Rent or other 87.6 40.2 64
2N Own 0 0
Rent or other 100 47.5 5
11 Own 11.4 46.5 239
Rent or other 88.6 22.2 2,002
1N Own 0 0
Rent or other 100 43.6 3
Initial Renters in the AHEAD
22 Own 11.9 8.8 31
Rent or other 88.1 10.4 253
2D Own 14.5 49.5 11
Rent or other 85.5 22.1 77
2N Own 5 0 1
Rent or other 95 34.3 17
11 Own 7.4 12.6 128
Rent or other 92.6 14.4 1,744
1N Own 3.4 0 7
Rent or other 96.6 89.1 204
Source: Based on authors’ estimates from the HRS and AHEAD.
Notes: All percentages are based on weighted samples. However, the sample sizes presented
in the table are unweighted. Initial renters in the last two panels include households with
“other” living arrangements. See text for explanations of household status abbreviations.transition between adjacent waves of each survey. For example, the transi-
tion labeled “22” identiﬁes a two-person household at the beginning of the
interval (the ﬁrst of the two waves) and at the end of the interval (in the sub-
sequent wave). The HRS yields as many as three transitions (wave 1 to
wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3, and wave 3 to wave 4), and each represents a two-
year interval. The AHEAD yields two transitions. The ﬁrst interval is two
years, and the second is three years. All intervals in the HRS are combined
to obtain the HRS results, and all intervals in the AHEAD are combined
to obtain the AHEAD results.
Consider ﬁrst the top panel of the table which pertains to the HRS
households who were homeowners at the beginning of an interval. The ﬁrst
column shows the percent of households that own and the percent that rent
(or have some other living arrangement) at the end of the interval. Of con-
tinuing two-person households, 98.3 percent still owned at the end of the
interval; 1.7 percent no longer owned. The ownership of initial owners de-
clined about 0.85 percent per year. Now consider continuing two-person
HRS households who were nonowners at the beginning of the period
shown in the third panel of table 3.3. Of these households 22.3 percent be-
came owners during the interval, about 11.1 percent per year. On balance
the number of homeowners increased: some initial owners became non-
owners, but a larger number of initial nonowners became owners. This net
addition to the homeowner group is shown graphically for the younger—
HRS—cohorts in ﬁgure 3.5. The ﬁgure, however, pertains to households
who continued as two-person families through all four waves of the HRS.
The data for continuing two-person households in the table, however, is
based on all households that continued as two-person families during any
two adjacent survey waves.
Other rows of the ﬁrst panel of table 3.3 show that if a spouse dies (2D),
the ownership rate remains high, at 95.6 percent. If a spouse enters a nurs-
ing home (2N), the ownership rate declines more, to 88.6 percent, al-
though the sample of nursing home entrants is quite small for the younger
HRS households. For continuing one-person HRS households, the own-
ership rate also remains high, at 95.2 percent. (There are only three single-
person households in which the person entered a nursing home during the
interval.)
The percent moving between adjacent waves is shown in the next column
of table 3.3. Of two-person HRS households that own in both waves, 7.1
percent moved over the two-year interval. For two-person households that
change from “own” to “rent or other,” the move rate is an unexpectedly low
65.7 percent. It is possible that ownership is transferred from parents to
children, so the parents do not move, but also no longer own. However, this
low move rate is more likely a reﬂection of reporting error. Inspection of
some of these cases shows households owning a house of roughly constant
value for three of the four waves. This evidence, combined with the absence
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or coding for one of the waves. Because there are a relatively small number
of these households, a few errors can have a substantial eﬀect on the move
rate.
Similar results for the AHEAD sample are presented in the second and
fourth panels. Initial homeowners in AHEAD were also likely to remain
owners unless there was a change in family status. For example, 96.9 per-
cent of continuing two-person households continued to own. But if one of
the members died, the ownership rate dropped to 88.8 percent. If one of the
members entered a nursing home, the rate dropped to 75 percent. For con-
tinuing one-person households, 91.3 percent remain owners. But if the
single person enters a nursing home, the ownership rate drops to 39.9 per-
cent. Thus, as with the younger HRS households, in the absence of pre-
cipitating shock, most AHEAD homeowners continue to own. But in the
event of a shock, the decline in ownership is greater for older than for
younger households. In addition, the decline is greater for one-person than
for two-person households.
The move rate for the older AHEAD households that own in both waves
is quite low, about 3.9 percent for two-person households and 4.5 percent
for one-person households. Because the interval between waves is about
2.5 years for the AHEAD, the annual move rates are 1.6 percent and 1.8
percent, respectively. Again, the low move rates among households that re-
port changing tenure suggest that some changes in tenure in the AHEAD
may be incorrectly reported.
Overall, table 3.3 suggests that homeowner households in the HRS age
group are very likely to remain owners. And even if one of the household
members dies or enters a nursing home, the rate of ownership remains
high. Homeowners in the AHEAD age group are also likely to continue to
own unless there is a change in family status, especially continuing two-
person households. When a member of this older household dies or enters
a nursing home, the decline in ownership is greater than for younger house-
holds. The greatest decline in ownership is for single-person AHEAD
households who enter a nursing home. Even among this group almost 40
percent continue to own.
3.2.2 Change in Home Equity
We next consider changes in home equity that parallel the transitions
shown in table 3.3. Home equity changes are presented in two formats. The
ﬁrst format shows changes for all households—initial owners and initial
renters-others. It shows changes for households who switch from owning
to renting, as well as those switching from renting to owning. And it shows
the net change in home equity for both groups combined. The second for-
mat is directed to the primary focus of our analysis, the change in home eq-
uity for initial homeowners. In this format we give particular attention to
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ers—those who remain in the same house. Although we discuss changes
based on changes in self-assessed home values here, we show below that the
exaggeration of self-assessed home value imparts large bias to the implied
changes in home equity. Then we consider changes based on home selling
prices compared to reported equity in newly purchased homes. We believe
these latter data are the most reliable, as discussed in the following.
In addition, the mover–stayer comparison is complicated by the data in-
consistencies discussed in the previous section. Some households report a
change in tenure without moving. While such changes are possible, we be-
lieve most such cases reﬂect reporting or coding errors. The information on
whether a household moved since the previous wave is likely to be accurate
because the prior address is incorporated in the survey question on mov-
ing.8In all calculations reported in the following, we delete all observations
with apparent transitions involving a change in tenure without a reported
move. Following this procedure, 1.1 percent of the HRS households and
3.4 percent of the AHEAD households are deleted.9
Change in home equity using the ﬁrst format is presented in table 3.4.
The family status designations are the same as those used in table 3.3.
There are four tenure designations: OO, OR, RO, and RR, where “O” in-
dicates own and “R” indicates rent or other living arrangement. Large re-
ductions in home equity are typically associated only with a home sale and
subsequent rental. Those who move from renting to owning, of course, in-
crease home equity. No matter what the change in family status, there is an
increase in the average equity of HRS households (with the exception of
the few 1N families). On the other hand, there is a decrease in the mean
home equity of AHEAD families, no matter what the change in family sta-
tus. The greatest decrease occurred when a family member entered a nurs-
ing home. For all continuing two-person households, the mean increase in
housing equity was $6,192 in the HRS and –$5,241 in the AHEAD. The
median increase was close to zero for households in each of the surveys. In
general, the median changes are smaller in absolute value than the mean
changes, but the relative patterns by family status and change in tenure are
similar.
Change in home equity of initial owners using the second format is
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8. For example, in wave 4 of the HRS (also wave 3 of the AHEAD) noninstitutionalized
respondents were asked “Are you still living, all of the year or part of the year, in the same
apartment/house in <previous wave address and city>?” Respondents in nursing homes were
asked “Do you still have the same apartment/house in <previous wave address and city>?” If
respondents in nursing homes answered aﬃrmatively, they may still be homeowners, and they
are not classiﬁed as movers.
9. Deleting all respondents who change tenure without moving reduces the frequency of
own-to-rent transitions. This aﬀects the HRS and AHEAD cohort ﬁgures previously pre-
sented. In particular, the cohort proﬁles for one-person AHEAD households (ﬁgure 3.6) be-
come ﬂat.Table 3.4 Change in the Housing Equity of Initial Owners and Initial Renters, 
by Change in Household Status
Means Medians
Survey and Change Change   Initial Change Initial
Household in in Housing Housing in Housing Housing
Status Tenure Equity Equity Equity Equity N
HRS
22 OO 6,565 102,893 1,695 81,326 8,919
OR –61,073 61,073 –50,905 50,905 164
RO 64,117 0 35,000 0 215
RR 0 0 0 0 822
All 6,192 92,472 0 72,721 10,120
2D OO 6,223 84,329 1,734 72,721 296
OR –75,575 75,575 –52,281 52,281 12
RO 45,707 0 6,000 0 8
RR 0 0 0 0 64
All 3,345 69,176 0 56,928 380
2N OO 4,203 83,650 2,450 79,994 12
OR 0 0 0 0 1
RO 0
RR 0 0 0 0 5
All 2,850 56,727 0 34,854 18
11 OO 642 96,874 621 62,333 2,961
OR –50,716 50,716 –40,663 40,663 161
RO 51,883 0 36,361 0 228
RR 0 0 0 0 2,002
All 1,126 57,784 0 20,897 5,352
1N OO –44,095 77,747 –3,971 33,971 2
OR 0
RO 0
RR 0 0 0 0 3
All –25,501 44,964 –3,971 33,971 5
AHEAD
22 OO –4,555 116,475 –2,217 90,242 2,309
OR –80,472 80,472 –67,682 67,682 74
RO 79,697 0 45,000 0 31
RR 0 0 0 0 253
All –5,241 103,938 –207 80,217 2,667
2D OO –7,182 107,705 –2,631 80,217 354
OR –80,749 80,749 –73,322 73,322 50
RO 70,915 0 58,825 0 11
RR 0 0 0 0 77
All –10,956 86,415 0 62,042 492
2N OO –18,869 122,320 –9,941 95,882 35
OR –97,003 97,003 –84,602 84,602 14
RO 13,369 0 13,369 0 1
RR 0 0 0 0 17
All –29,941 90,771 –9,782 62,042 67
(continued)shown in table 3.5. The key question here is whether continuing homeown-
ers who move and buy another house reduce home equity more than stay-
ers, who can serve as the control group in this comparison. If movers typi-
cally wanted to use some of the wealth accumulated in home equity to
support other nonhousing consumption, the home equity of movers would
be reduced relative to the change in the equity of stayers. The ﬁrst two pan-
els of table 3.5 show the mean change in housing equity for the HRS and
AHEAD; the next two panels show medians. The change in family status
is shown on the left margin. Consider the ﬁrst three rows of the upper panel
of the table, which pertain to two-person households in the HRS. The own-
ership status (tenure) at the end of the interval is shown along the top mar-
gin. A household can continue to own or become a renter (or have some
other living arrangement) at the end of the interval. The change in home
equity is shown for continuing owners, for renters-others, and for both
groups combined (all). The initial home value for each group is shown in
the right column of the table. On average, the mean home equity of con-
tinuing two-person households increased by $3,305. For those who re-
mained home owners, equity increased by $6,569. Initial homeowners
whose transition was to the rent-other group reduced home equity by
$54,155 on average. The average initial home value of continuing two-
person households was $102,310. Thus home equity of the home sellers
was only about half of the average equity of all continuing two-person
households.
Some of those who continued to own stayed in the same house, others
moved and bought a new house. The equity of those who stayed increased
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11 OO –4,675 103,232 –1,739 74,869 2,801
OR –81,412 81,412 –67,682 67,682 266
RO 73,623 0 50,269 0 128
RR 0 0 0 0 1,744
All –5,265 64,540 0 37,434 4,939
1N OO –13,013 82,910 –6,040 69,521 57
OR –72,546 72,546 –56,401 56,401 79
RO 57,386 0 65,000 0 7
RR 0 0 0 0 204
All –18,043 30,229 0 0 347
Note: N   number of observations.
Table 3.4 (continued)
Means Medians
Survey and Change Change   Initial Change Initial
Household in in Housing Housing in Housing Housing
Status Tenure Equity Equity Equity Equity NTable 3.5 Change in Housing Equity of Initial Owners, by Change in Family Status and by
Subsequent Tenure
Tenure in Subsequent Period Number of Observations
Change in Rent or Rent or Initial




All 6,569 –54,155 5,855 8,918 106 9,024 102,310
Stayer 6,686 6,686 8,295 0 8,295 102,852
Mover 5,074 –54,155 –3,305 623 106 729 96,335
2D
All 6,288 –28,079 5,547 294 7 301 83,212
Stayer 8,997 8,997 266 0 266 83,939
Mover –21,935 –28,079 –23,169 28 7 35 77,158
2N
All 4,203 4,203 12 0 12 83,650
Stayer 4,750 4,750 9 0 9 88,372
Mover 1,863 1,863 3 0 3 63,426
11
All 642 –48,476 –697 2,961 86 3,047 95,555
Stayer 935 935 2,779 0 2,779 96,012
Mover –3,739 –48,476 –17,549 182 86 268 90,829
1N
All –44,095 –44,095 2 0 0 77,747
Stayer –44,095 –44,095 2 0 2 77,747
Mover 0 0 0 0
AHEAD
22
All –4,555 –73,974 –5,367 2,309 30 2,339 115,978
Stayer –4,103 –4,103 2,213 0 2,213 115,103
Mover –15,877 –73,974 –29,557 96 30 126 132,706
2D
All –7,182 –81,900 –13,805 354 39 393 105,418
Stayer –5,777 –5,777 322 0 322 102,228
Mover –20,432 –81,900 –51,390 32 39 71 120,352
2N
All –18,869 –105,730 –37,168 35 12 47 118,825
Stayer –18,498 –18,498 33 0 33 123,456
Mover –24,319 –105,730 –90,020 2 12 14 105,715
11
All –4,675 –92,350 –8,446 2,801 126 2,927 102,764
Stayer –4,011 –4,011 2,671 0 2,671 102,209
Mover –18,500 –92,350 –55,077 130 126 256 108,598
1N
All –13,013 –73,671 –48,315 57 72 129 77,533
Stayer –13,013 –13,013 57 0 57 82,910




All 693 –50,905 1,474 8,918 106 9,024 81,033
Stayer 1,745 1,745 8,295 0 8,295 81,326
Mover –360 –50,905 –4,946 623 106 729 72,721
2D
All –1,632 –32,530 1,474 294 7 301 71,491
Stayer 2,217 2,217 266 0 266 73,193
Mover –5,481 –32,530 –10,999 28 7 35 42,594
2N
All 6,794 2,450 12 0 12 79,994
Stayer –2,311 –2,311 9 0 9 79,994
Mover 15,899 15,899 3 0 3 87,989
11
All 125 –40,633 222 2,961 86 3,047 60,493
Stayer 639 639 2,779 0 2,779 62,333
Mover –389 –40,633 –8,854 182 86 268 49,376
1N
All –3,971 –3,971 2 0 0 33,971
Stayer –3,971 –3,971 2 0 2 33,971
Mover 0 0 0
AHEAD
22
All –5,179 –64,173 –2,348 2,309 30 2,339 90,242
Stayer –2,087 –2,087 2,213 0 2,213 89,114
Mover –8,271 –64,173 –16,869 96 30 126 101,608
2D
All –10,008 –73,322 –4,869 354 39 393 80,090
Stayer –2,303 –2,303 322 0 322 76,706
Mover –17,712 –73,322 –50,761 32 39 71 80,217
2N
All –26,230 –90,242 –13,978 35 12 47 90,242
Stayer –9,941 –9,941 33 0 33 95,882
Mover –42,520 –90,242 –54,145 2 12 14 90,242
11
All –2,087 –73,322 –2,434 2,801 126 2,927 73,799
Stayer –1,739 –1,739 2,671 0 2,671 73,322
Mover –2,434 –73,322 –37,434 130 126 256 74,869
1N
All –6,040 –64,173 –39,921 57 72 129 64,173
Stayer –6,040 –6,040 57 0 57 69,521
Mover –64,173 –64,173 0 72 72 64,173
Table 3.5 (continued)
Tenure in Subsequent Period Number of Observations
Change in Rent or Rent or Initial
Household Status Own Other All Own Other All Home Equityby $6,686. The equity of those who moved and bought a new house also in-
creased, by $5,074. In the somewhat more formal estimation in the follow-
ing we use the change in the equity of the stayers as a measure of the in-
crease the movers would have experienced had they not moved. In this case
the decrease for movers was $1,612, about 1.7 percent of the initial home
equity of this group. Thus these movers who bought a new home are not
typically taking substantial home equity out of housing to support other
consumption. By this measure, the greatest decline in home equity oc-
curred in mover households in which a member died, although the sample
sizes are small and the means are not precisely measured. For example, the
home equity of the small number of two-person households who move but
continue to own when one member dies declines by $21,935.
The average equity of continuing one-person HRS households declined
by $697, a very small fraction of the average initial home equity of $95,555.
Continuing one-person households who moved but continued to own re-
duced home equity by $3,739, and the stayers increased equity by $935. Us-
ing the stayers as a control, the movers reduced equity by 4.8 percent of the
initial home equity of this group.
In summary, the average home equity of two-person HRS households
increased over this period. This was true for continuing two-person house-
holds as well as those in which a member died or in which a member en-
tered a nursing home. The equity of one-person households declined only
slightly. Continuing owners who moved typically reduced home equity
only marginally, when compared to stayers. The only substantial reduction
in the home equity of continuing owners was for households in which one
member died.
For the older AHEAD households, changes in home equity are also typ-
ically associated with precipitating shocks. But for the older households
the shocks are more frequent. Consider continuing two-person households
ﬁrst. The equity of continuing stayer-owners (who do not move) declined
by $4,103 and can serve as a base of comparison for other groups. This re-
duction, if taken at face value, apparently reﬂects a fall in the value of the
homes of the older households as they continue to live in the homes, but
not direct withdrawal of housing equity to support other consumption.
(Estimates based on housing value rather than equity yields the same re-
sult.) This decline is only slightly less than the average reduction for all con-
tinuing two-person households, $5,367. Thus on average we conclude that
little housing equity is taken from housing to support other consumption.
Continuing homeowners who move reduce home equity by $15,877,
which is $11,322 more than the reduction in home equity of the stayers. We
take this to represent funds taken from housing that might be used to sup-
port other nonhousing consumption. It represents, however, only about
10.5 percent of initial home equity for these households, and less than 4
percent of their initial nonhousing wealth. Remember that the typical
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duction in housing equity can only be a one-time addition to funds avail-
able for other consumption. In the following we show that even this small
reduction is probably exaggerated and that in fact the average change is
likely positive (an increase in housing equity).
For continuing owners in two-person households in which a member en-
ters a nursing home, the reduction in the home equity of the movers is
$5,821 greater than the reduction for the stayers. The reduction in the
home equity of continuing one-person households is also small. Particular
movers who continue to own reduce home equity by a small fraction of ini-
tial home equity.
In summary, among the older AHEAD households, the reduction in
home equity of continuing owners is small relative to initial home equity,
even among those who move to a diﬀerent house. Large reductions in home
equity are typically observed only for home owners who move and discon-
tinue home ownership. The probability of such a move is larger in cases of
precipitating shocks. But as seen in tables 3.3 and 3.4, even in the event of
shocks to family status, most households continue to own and thus do not
withdraw equity from housing to support other needs. For all HRS groups,
the initial home equity of the seller (rent-other) group was much lower than
the equity of the continuing owners. For the older AHEAD households,
the initial home equity of sellers is also less than the initial home equity of
continuing owners, although the diﬀerence is much smaller than for the
HRS households.
Median changes in home equity are shown in the bottom half of table
3.5. The pattern of change is essentially the same as the pattern for mean
changes. The changes, however, are typically smaller than the mean
changes, in particular for the older AHEAD households. For example, for
continuing two-person households in the HRS, the median increase in
home equity is $1,474. The increase for continuing owner-movers is only
$2,105 greater than for stayers. For continuing one-person families the me-
dian increase is $222. And the reduction for continuing owner-movers is
only $1,028 greater than for stayers. Among continuing two-person house-
holds in the AHEAD sample, movers reduce equity by $6,184. Continuing
one-person households reduce equity by $695. Again, the conclusion is
that for the most part housing equity is substantially reduced only after a
precipitating shock. In the absence of a shock, the reductions in housing
equity by movers represent a small fraction of initial housing equity.
3.2.3 Respondent Estimates of Home Values versus Sales Prices
Before turning to some simple estimation, we emphasize that respon-
dent assessment of home equity likely overestimates home value by a sub-
stantial margin. Thus reliance on reported home values yields exaggerated
reductions in housing equity when homeowners move. Substantial evi-
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and Zabel (1999) surveyed the literature and concluded that self-reported
home values exceed actual sale prices or appraisal values by 2 to 16 per-
cent. Their analysis showed that homeowners on average overvalue their
home by 8 percent, and that owners with long tenure overvalue their
houses even more. In other words, when a family moves the realized sale
price is typically less than the family’s prior estimate of the home value.
This creates a bias in our estimate of the change in housing equity among
movers. The premove estimate is inﬂated. The postmove price is presum-
ably accurate because the purchase transaction was recently completed.
The estimates in tables 3.4 and 3.5 on the change in housing equity be-
tween waves are based on HRS and AHEAD respondent self-assessment
of home values and are aﬀected by such overvaluation. The tendency to
overvalue homes confounds mover-stayer comparisons. Recent movers are
likely to know the market value of their homes. Stayers, on the other hand,
are likely to overvalue their houses.10 As a result, the change in home eq-
uity is more likely to show a larger price decrease for movers than for stay-
ers. Thus in the previous tables movers, relative to stayers, appear to be tak-
ing more equity out of their homes than is actually the case.
Information obtained in both the HRS and the AHEAD allows us to
gauge the extent of this bias. For households that have recently moved, the
surveys inquired about the “selling price” of the house. The sale price can
be compared to the reported value of the house in the previous wave. The
survey also asks for the month and year of the sale; the month and year of
the self-assessed value is the interview date. We index the premove assessed
value of movers and the postmove price of movers to obtain measures in
1998 dollars.11 From these values we obtain estimates of the overvaluation
bias.
Mean and median diﬀerences between assessed values and sale prices
are shown in the table 3.6. The results suggest that both the HRS and the
AHEAD respondents overestimated their home values by 15 to 20 percent,
based on a comparison of mean values. Based on medians, home values are
overestimated by 6 to 7 percent. The mean dollar diﬀerences are $20,000 to
$30,000, and median dollar diﬀerences are $6,000 to $8,000. This suggests
that our calculated reductions in the home equity of continuing owner-
movers may be due entirely to valuation bias. For example, the mean re-
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10. We suspect this is most likely to be the case when house prices are not rising rapidly. An-
other factor that may lead to overestimates by stayers is that most homeowners know the ask-
ing price of similar homes in their neighborhood, but may be unaware of the actual selling
price.
11. Some movers are missing data for the sale price. The HRS and AHEAD provide no im-
putations for missing values of the sale price. A bracketing technique is used to obtain ranges
for persons unable to provide a sale price, but we have made no attempt here to convert the
bracketed amounts to values. The analysis is restricted to observations that specify a sale
price.duction of $15,887 (or $11,322 using the stayers as a control) in the home
equity of two-person AHEAD families who move and continue to own
would be more than accounted for by such bias.
3.2.4 More Formal Estimates of Change in Home Equity
Here we consider more formally the change in home equity of movers
and stayers. As mentioned above, one way to think about this is to treat
movers as the treatment group and stayers as the control group. The home
equity of stayers and movers at the beginning and at the end of the interval
can be represented by the following table:
Beginning End
Stayers      t
Movers      t   m
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Table 3.6 Comparison of Estimated Home Values and Sale Prices
Estimate of Reported
Home Value Sale Price Mean Percent
Survey Interval in Initial Year in Next Year Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
Means
HRS 1992–1994
(250) 135,607 115,665 19,942 14.7
1994–1996
(233) 157,068 123,883 33,186 21.1
1996–1998
(236) 162,264 138,206 24,048 14.8
AHEAD 1993–1995
(163) 101,568 81,625 19,943 19.6
1995–1998
(179) 131,382 109,447 21,935 16.7
Medians
HRS 1992–1994
(250) 106,151 96,208 7,117 6.7
1994–1996
(233) 109,838 98,347 8,083 7.4
1996–1998
(236) 140,159 122,276 8,290 5.9
AHEAD 1993–1995
(163) 83,848 69,094 5,888 7
1995–1998
(179) 89,445 77,081 6,546 7.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from the AHEAD and HRS.
Notes:All ﬁgures are in 1998 dollars and use household weights. Numbers in parentheses are
sample sizes.In this case, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate yields m, the treatment
eﬀect. We can estimate this for all households combined, or for any sub-
group, by
(1)  E   t   mM,
where t is a constant term—and represents a time (inﬂation) eﬀect—and
m is the additional eﬀect for movers, with M a dummy variable identifying
movers.
Estimates of this equation, by change in household status, are shown in
table 3.7. This table presents estimates for households who owned at both
the beginning and at the end of the interval. Data are presented by the sub-
sequent—at the end of the interval—status of the initial homeowners. Or-
dinary least squares (OLS) estimates are shown in the left portion of the
table. Median regression estimates are shown in the right portion of the
table. The median regression estimates should be less aﬀected than the
OLS estimates by reporting errors or other outliers in the data.
The key mover eﬀect estimate, m, measures the diﬀerence between the
change in the equity of stayers and the change for movers. The OLS esti-
mates show negative mover eﬀects in each comparison, but only the mover
eﬀects for the HRS 2D and AHEAD 11 groups are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. And, with the possible excep-
tion of the estimated mover eﬀect for the 2 to D HRS households, the esti-
mated eﬀect is much lower than the bias suggested in table 3.6. For ex-
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Table 3.7 Estimates of the Mover Equity Eﬀect using Stayers as the “Control” Group, 
for Initial Homeowners, for Two- and One-Person Households, for the HRS 
and the AHEAD Households, by Estimation Method
OLS Estimates Median Regression Estimates
Change in Time Mover Time Mover
Household Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect 
Status (t) t-statistic (m) t-statistic (t) t-statistic (m) t-statistic
HRS
2 to 2 6,686 2.26 –1,612 0.15 1,745 6.98 –2,104 2.24
2 to D 8,997 2.62 –30,931 2.67 2,216 1.66 –7,698 1.76
2 to N 4,750 0.26 –2,887 0.07 –2,311 0.2 18,210 1.16
1 to 1 935 0.45 –4,674 0.57 639 1.8 –1,028 0.73
1 to N
AHEAD
2 to 2 –4,103 2.46 –11,774 1.38 –2,087 4.05 –6,185 2.46
2 to D –5,777 1.5 –14,656 1.18 –2,303 1.51 –15,409 3.16
2 to N –18,498 2.61 –5,821 0.21 –9,941 3.77 –32,579 4.49
1 to 1 –4,011 2.57 –14,489 1.99 –1,739 5.28 –696 0.47
1 to N
Note: Too few observations to estimate 1 to N transitions.ample, the estimated mover eﬀect for continuing two-person households is
–$1,612. Referring back to table 3.6, however, we see that the bias estimate
for HRS households is between $20,000 and $33,000. Thus because most
families are continuing two-person families, a reasonable judgment from
these data is that the equity of the continuing two-person households in
fact increased by about $25,000. Coincidentally, this increase matches the
estimated increase for such households based on selling prices, which is
discussed in the following. For each of the other groups, with the exception
of the HRS 2 to D families, the estimated mover eﬀect is much less than the
bias estimates shown in table 3.6, suggesting rather large increases in home
equity.
For the HRS households, the median regression mover eﬀect estimates
are also small and typically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. And, the
estimates are less than the median bias estimates in table 3.6. Based on the
estimated mover eﬀects in conjunction with the bias estimates, we conclude
that home equity likely increases substantially when families move and buy
another home.
The median estimates for the AHEAD households are larger than the
median HRS estimates and are more precisely measured. For the 2D and
2N groups, the estimates are greater than the bias estimates in table 3.6, in
particular for the 2N group. Thus these data suggest that for households in
which a member dies, and for households in which a member enters a nurs-
ing home, home equity is reduced when these households move and buy
again. The following analysis is based on selling prices; however, it suggests
an increase in the median home equity of these groups as well.
3.2.5 Estimates Based on Selling Price
Each home owner reinterviewed in the HRS and AHEAD is asked
whether the home was sold since the previous interview. For many of these
households, the selling price is reported.12 In this section, we estimate the
change in the home equity of families who sell and buy another home and
the change in equity of those who sell and then choose another tenure.
Table 3.8 shows summary data on home equity for adjacent waves of HRS
and AHEAD. The ﬁrst column shows reported home equity from the ﬁrst
of the two waves. The second column shows the reported selling price (ob-
tained from the second wave interview) minus the mortgage reported in the
initial wave. The sale occurred sometime between the two waves, but the
mortgage pertains to the data of the last interview prior to the sale. The
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12. There is more missing sale price data than home equity data, used in earlier sections of
the paper. Home equity (home value and mortgage balance) is obtained from the housing
module. Information on the sale price is obtained from a module on capital gains that has
more incomplete responses. There are no imputations for missing or incomplete (bracketed)
sale price data. Partly for this reason, we do not use the weights when analyzing the sale price
data.third column shows home equity reported in the second of the two waves.
For households who purchased another home (the ﬁrst and third panels of
the table), this is the equity in the newly purchased home. For households
that did not purchase another home (the second and fourth panels), this
column is zero.
Like the data in table 3.6 on reported home values versus selling prices,
these data show that households who sell and buy another home substan-
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Table 3.8 Comparison of Initial Reported Home Equity, Selling Price minus
Mortgage, and Home Equity at the End of the Interval
Initial Reported Selling Price Reported Equity
Equity Prior to minus at End of Sample
Interval Home Sale Mortgage Interval Size
Mean for Households that Purchased Another House
HRS
1992–1994 76,518 64,940 89,317 181
1994–1996 112,382 86,599 126,228 174
1996–1998 108,412 89,038 120,990 166
AHEAD
1993–1995 108,821 89,284 110,690 71
1995–1998 154,104 114,388 123,737 61
Mean for Households that Did Not Purchase Another House
HRS
1992–1994 61,851 55,697 0 55
1994–1996 52,308 57,226 0 48
1996–1998 72,408 86,769 0 38
AHEAD
1993–1995 75,857 61,543 0 44
1995–1998 78,005 72,313 0 51
Median for Households that Purchased Another House
HRS
1992–1994 57,679 49,806 65,903 181
1994–1996 74,941 69,045 88,852 174
1996–1998 82,636 72,082 110,964 166
AHEAD
1993–1995 78,258 67,826 79,590 71
1995–1998 95,013 70,606 96,000 61
Median for Households that Did Not Purchase Another House
HRS
1992–1994 55,137 39,649 0 55
1994–1996 32,819 42,664 0 48
1996–1998 69,561 85,949 0 38
AHEAD
1993–1995 72,668 65,244 0 44
1995–1998 79,590 73,213 0 51
Notes: No imputed variables are used. All values are in 1998 dollars. The data are not
weighted.tially overestimate their presale housing equity. For those who sell and do
not purchase another home, the overestimation is not so apparent. For sev-
eral of these groups the reported equity seems to underestimate realized
equity, based on selling price minus the mortgage. We believe that the re-
ported selling price is likely to be close to the actual selling price, unlike the
presale assessment of home equity. The last column shows reported home
equity at the end of the interval. In principle, home equity right after a pur-
chase should also be accurately reported. For each of the intervals, the re-
ported new home equity at the end of the period is substantially greater
than gain in home equity from the sale of the prior home, suggesting that
equity in the new home is greater than equity in the prior home.
Based on the same data, table 3.9 shows the estimated change in home
equity for households that have sold a home and purchased another, by
change in family status. These estimates are obtained from simple OLS and
median regression estimates of the form
(2)  E   m   ε,
where  E is equity in the new home at the end of the period minus equity
from the sale of the prior home. Here, m is the estimated increase in home
equity. This speciﬁcation is estimated for several years separately and for
several family status change groups. For all but two groups, there is a sub-
stantial increase in home equity. Many of the estimates are for small
groups, however, and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We now consider whether the change in home equity depends on the re-
lationship between income and housing wealth. It might be expected that
persons with relatively low income and relatively high housing equity
would be more likely to withdraw housing equity. And those with low eq-
uity and high income would be more likely to add to housing equity. We be-
gin with estimates of the probability of moving and buying another home,
and the probability of moving and discontinuing home ownership, thus
withdrawing all housing equity. These outcomes will depend, in particular,
on the level of home equity and the level of income in the initial period.
Then we show estimates of the relationship between the change in equity,
given a move on the one hand, and initial income and home equity levels
on the other hand.
Households that own in the initial period can either stay in the same
house, move to another house, or discontinue home ownership by moving
to a rental apartment or some other arrangement. The probabilities of the
latter two transitions may be speciﬁed as
(3) Pr[OmO]   c(2D or 2N or 1N)   a11   b22    Y    E    Y   E   ε
Pr[OR]   c(2D or 2N or 1N)  a11  b22    Y   E   Y E ε,
where OmO identiﬁes families who sell a home, then move and buy another
home (own to move to own), and OR identiﬁes families who discontinue
160 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wiseownership (own to rent or other). The parameter a is the eﬀect of a contin-
uing one-person household, and b is the eﬀect of a continuing two-person
household. (The estimated parameters are, of course, not constrained to be
the same for the OmO and OR groups.) The omitted categories, captured
in the constant term c(2D, 2N, and 1N), are the 2D, 2N, and 1N house-
holds. Initial period income is denoted by Y and initial home equity is de-
noted by E. Here,   indicates whether the eﬀect of Y depends on E (or,
equivalently, whether the eﬀect of E depends on Y ).
Given the decision to move to another home or to discontinue owner-
ship, we then estimate the conditional change in home equity for the two
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Table 3.9 Estimates of the Change in Home Equity for Movers Who Bought
Another Home, by Method of Estimations, for HRS and AHEAD
Intervals
Estimated Change in Sample
Interval Home Equity (1998 $) t-statistic Size
OLS Estimates
HRS
1992–1994 24,377 3.54 181
1994–1996 39,629 2.86 174
1996–1998 31,952 4.55 166
AHEAD
1993–1995 21,406 1.37 71
1995–1998 9,349 0.59 61
HRS (pooled waves)
2 to 2 31,345 6.39 373
1 to 1 40,014 1.73 96
Other 20,742 1.5 52
AHEAD (pooled waves)
2 to 2 13,887 0.91 63
1 to 1 9,052 0.45 52
Other 43,794 2.01 17
Median Regression Estimates
HRS
1992–1994 6,303 1.86 181
1994–1996 15,455 2.35 174
1996–1998 19,803 3.42 166
AHEAD
1993–1995 1,066 0.24 71
1995–1998 9,818 1.12 61
HRS (pooled waves)
2 to 2 17,153 4.01 373
1 to 1 –294 0.04 86
Other 8,856 1.11 52
AHEAD (pooled waves)
2 to 2 3,438 0.37 63
1 to 1 0 0 52
Other 10,111 0.55 17groups, given that a move occurs. The change in equity equations are in the
same format, given by
(4)  E(OmO)   c(2D or 2N or 1N)   a11   b22    Y    E
   Y   E   ε
 E(OR)   c(2D or 2N or 1N)   a11   b22    Y    E
   Y   E   ε.
Given the estimated probabilities and conditional changes in housing eq-
uity, we can simulate the expected change in equity for homeowners as
(5)  E    E(OmO)    E(OR) 
  Pr[OmO]   E( EOmO)   Pr[OR]   E( EOR),
where the expected change is decomposed into its component parts. We
present below the simulation for selected quantiles on income and home
equity.
Simulated probabilities of moving between the waves are shown in table
3.10. The estimated probit parameter estimates and selected quantiles of
home equity and income used to produce this table are shown in table 3A.1.
The top three panels of table 3.10 pertain to HRS households, and the bot-
tom three panels pertain to AHEAD households. Simulated probabilities
of moving and buying another home are shown on the left side of each
panel, and probabilities of moving and discontinuing ownership are shown
on the right. The simulations show that initial income and home equity
have little eﬀect on the probabilities of moving, although in some instances
the estimated parameters are statistically diﬀerent from zero. For both
HRS and AHEAD households, the diﬀerence between the probabilities for
“house-poor and income-rich” households and for “house-rich and in-
come-poor” households is only a few percentage points. Consistent with
the preceding ﬁndings, the probability of moving is highest among house-
holds that have experienced a disruption in household structure. For ex-
ample, among AHEAD households the probability of moving and discon-
tinuing ownership is 1.5 percent (evaluated at median income and home
equity) for continuing two-person households, 4.4 percent for continuing
one-person households, and 21.2 percent for households in which a mem-
ber has either died or entered a nursing home between the waves.
The simulated change (between the survey waves) in home equity for
families who move and buy another home is shown in table 3.11. The asso-
ciated parameter estimates in table 3A.2 show that initial income and home
equity have substantial and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the change.
Both OLS and median regression estimates are shown. The greater the
level of initial home equity (based on selling price minus the mortgage), the
smaller the increase in equity when the family moves, and the larger the ini-
162 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wisetial income, the greater the increase in home equity for households that
move. The equity-income interaction, however, is imprecisely measured.
The estimated diﬀerence in the change in home equity for the 11 or for the
22 groups compared to the 2D-2N-1N groups combined is not statistically
signiﬁcant. These estimates are based on the sample of respondents that re-
port a sale price for the former home and report both the home value and
mortgage debt for their current home.13
Evaluated at the median (50th quantile) of income and home equity, the
simulated change in equity shown in table 3.11 is positive for all family sta-
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Table 3.10 Simulated Move Probabilities at Selected Income and Home Equity
Quartiles, for HRS and AHEAD Households
Equity
Buy Another Home Discontinue Ownership
Income 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th
HRS 2 to 2 Households
20th 0.063 0.063 0.015 0.013
50th 0.065 0.013
80th 0.069 0.070 0.011 0.009
HRS 1 to 1 Households
20th 0.055 0.056 0.031 0.027
50th 0.058 0.026
80th 0.061 0.062 0.023 0.020
HRS Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th 0.090 0.091 0.031 0.027
50th 0.094 0.027
80th 0.099 0.099 0.024 0.021
AHEAD 2 to 2 Households
20th 0.034 0.041 0.017 0.015
50th 0.037 0.015
80th 0.037 0.043 0.014 0.011
AHEAD 1 to 1 Households
20th 0.039 0.047 0.049 0.044
50th 0.043 0.044
80th 0.042 0.049 0.041 0.035
AHEAD Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th 0.049 0.059 0.228 0.211
50th 0.054 0.212
80th 0.053 0.062 0.204 0.182
13. Both the sale price of the old home and the value of and mortgage on the new home are
reported in the same wave. The survey does not inquire about the mortgage obligation dis-
charged on the old home. To obtain home equity for the old home we use the mortgage re-
ported in the prior wave.tus groups, with the exception of the simulation for the AHEAD 11 house-
holds, based on median regression estimates. For all family status groups,
the greatest simulated reduction in home equity is at the 80th equity quar-
tile and 20th income quantile. The greatest simulated increase in home eq-
uity is at the 80th income quartile and the 20th equity quantile. Thus rela-
tively house-rich and income-poor families reduce equity, and relatively
house-poor and income-rich households add to home equity when they
move and buy another home. For example, based on the OLS estimates for
the HRS 22 households, at the high-equity-low-income quantiles, home
equity is reduced by –$15,422; at the low-equity-high-income quantiles,
home equity is increased by   $54,778. The pattern of the simulated
changes based on the median regression estimates is similar to the pattern
based on OLS estimates.
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Table 3.11 Simulated Changes in Housing Equity at Selected Income and Home




Income 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th
HRS 2 to 2 Households
20th 38,176 –15,422 24,353 –23,870
50th 25,061 11,929
80th 54,778 1,854 37,510 –9,537
HRS 1 to 1 Households
20th 36,090 –17,508 13,825 –34,397
50th 22,975 1,402
80th 52,692 –232 26,982 –20,065
HRS Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th 36,041 –17,557 14,588 –33,635
50th 22,926 2,164
80th 52,644 –280 27,744 –19,303
AHEAD 2 to 2 Households
20th 34,548 –28,386 29,758 –46,091
50th 17,970 5,337
80th 52,781 –9,021 38,129 –33,449
AHEAD 1 to 1 Households
20th 27,834 –35,099 8,974 –66,874
50th 11,256 –15,447
80th 46,067 –15,735 17,345 –54,233
AHEAD Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th 43,547 –19,386 29,526 –46,323
50th 26,970 5,105
80th 61,781 –22 37,897 –33,681The change (decrease) in the home equity of the families who discon-
tinue home ownership is shown intable 3.12, and the associated parameter
estimates are shown in table 3A.3. In this case, the decline in equity is
simply the sale price minus the mortgage. Thus we cannot use the initial
home equity to predict the change in equity, as in table 3.11 for those who
sell and buy again. Thus estimates of the reduction in equity are based on
income only. Essentially the simulated changes show how home equity is
related to income. For this selected group of households who sell and do
not buy another home, home equity is negatively related to income. The
greatest equity reductions occur in families where a household member
dies or in which a household member enters a nursing home.
In summary, the move probabilities and change in home equity results
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Table 3.12 Simulated Changes in Housing Equity at Selected Income and Home
Equity Quartiles for Households Not Purchasing Another Home, for
HRS and AHEAD Households
Equity
OLS Median Regression
Income 20th 50th 80th 20th 50th 80th
HRS 2 to 2 Households
20th –53,822 –53,822 –37,994 –37,994
50th –58,323 –43,176
80th –65,153 –65,153 –51,040 –51,040
HRS 1 to 1 Households
20th –59,492 –59,492 –46,077 –46,077
50th –63,993 –51,258
80th –70,823 –70,823 –59,122 –59,122
HRS Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th –72,577 –72,577 –56,630 –56,630
50th –77,077 –61,811
80th –83,907 –83,907 –69,675 –69,675
AHEAD 2 to 2 Households
20th –54,127 –54,127 –43,203 –43,203
50th –60,653 –50,522
80th –72,544 –72,544 –63,859 –63,859
AHEAD 1 to 1 Households
20th –54,039 –54,039 –51,688 –51,688
50th –60,565 –59,007
80th –72,455 –72,455 –72,344 –72,344
AHEAD Other Households (2D, 2N, 1N)
20th –78,865 –78,865 –78,698 –78,698
50th –85,391 –86,017
80th –97,281 –97,281 –99,354 –99,354reported in tables 3.10–3.12 are combined to calculate expected change in
housing equity. These results are reported on an annualbasis in table 3.13.14
The top part of the table shows results for movers who sell and buy another
house. The bottom part shows results for movers who sell and discontinue
ownership. The table shows results by equity-income quantile, as in several
of the preceding tables. But in this table, the expected change in equity is
decomposed into its component parts: the probability of a move and the
change in equity given a move. For example, consider the HRS 22 house-
holds. Evaluated at the median of home equity and income, the expected
increase in equity through home “upgrading” is $815. Only 3.3 percent of
families upgrade each year, but those that do add $12,531 to home equity.
Averaged over all HRS households, home equity is increased by $823
through selling and buying a new home. Evaluated at the median of home
equity and income, about 1.5 percent of AHEAD 22 households move and
buy another home each year. Those that do add $7,426 to home equity. The
expected increase in home equity, averaged across all AHEAD household
types, is $399. Viewed in this way, the expected changes in the equity of
HRS and AHEAD households are not very diﬀerent at the median:  $823
for the HRS group and  $399 for the AHEAD group.
For HRS 22 households with high initial housing equity and low income
(the 80-20 column), the expected annual reduction in equity is –$486: 3.2
percent move and, given a move, the reduction in home equity is –$7,711.
Averaged over all HRS households in this high-equity-low-income group,
the expected reduction in home equity through selling and buying another
home is –$528. The AHEAD households reveal a similar pattern, although
again they are less likely to move than the younger HRS households.
The estimates for persons who sell and discontinue ownership are shown
in the bottom half of the table. Again consider HRS 22 families evaluated
at the median of equity and income. Only 0.7 percent of households dis-
continue ownership each year. Those that do reduce equity by –$29,162, on
average. Averaged over all HRS 22 families, equity is reduced by –$379
through divesting of homes. This reduction can be compared to the  $815
average increase through upgrading. Overall, the average equity of all HRS
households is reduced by –$610 in this way, compared to an increase of
 $823 through upgrading. For all AHEAD households average equity is
reduced by –$1,918 by sellers who discontinue ownership between survey
waves, compared with an increase of  $399 through movers who upgrade.
Table 3.14 presents a succinct accounting of the expected annual change
in the home equity of all HRS initial homeowners combined and of all
AHEAD initial homeowners combined. The ﬁrst column shows the ex-
pected change in home equity for households who move and purchase an-
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14. Waves of the HRS were two years apart. In the AHEAD there were two years between
wave 1 and wave 2, and three years between wave 2 and wave 3.Table 3.13 Summary of Annual Change in Home Equity of Initial Homeowners, Decomposed
into Probability of a Move Times the Change in Equity Given the Move, by
Household Status, for Selected Equity and Income Quantiles (based on probit move
probability estimates and OLS equity change estimates)
Equity-Income Quantile
Household
Survey Status 50-50 80-20 20-80 80-80 20-20
Movers Who Sell and Buy a New Home
HRS 22 Prob OmO .033 .032 .035 .035 .032
ChangeOmO 12,531 –7,711 27,389 927 19,088
Expected change 815 –486 1,890 65 1,203
11 Prob OmO .029 .028 .031 .031 .028
ChangeOmO 11,488 –8,754 26,346 –116 18,045
Expected change 667 –490 1,607 –7 993
Other Prob OmO .047 .046 .050 .050 .045
ChangeOmO 11,463 –8,779 26,322 –140 18,021
Expected change 1,078 –799 2,606 –14 1,622
All Expected change 823 –528 1,935 42 1,221
AHEAD 22 Prob OmO .015 .017 .015 .018 .014
ChangeOmO 7,426 –11,730 21,810 –3,728 14,276
Expected change 275 –481 807 –160 486
11 Prob OmO .018 .019 .017 .020 .016
ChangeOmO 4,651 –14,504 19,036 –6,502 11,502
Expected change 200 –682 800 –319 449
Other Prob OmO .022 .024 .022 .026 .020
ChangeOmO 11,145 –8,011 25,529 –9 17,995
Expected change 602 –473 1,353 0 882
All Expected change 399 –528 1,045 –130 650
Movers Who Sell and Discontinue Ownership
HRS 22 Prob OR .007 .007 .006 .005 .008
ChangeOR –29,162 –26,911 –32,577 –32,577 –26,911
Expected change –379 –350 –359 –293 –404
11 Prob OR .013 .014 .012 .010 .016
ChangeOR –31,997 –29,746 –35,412 –35,412 –29,746
Expected change –832 –803 –815 –708 –922
Other Prob OR .014 .014 .012 .011 .016
ChangeOR –38,539 –36,289 –41,954 –41,954 –36,289
Expected change –1,041 –980 –1,007 –881 –1,125
All Expected change –610 –576 –588 –502 –662
AHEAD 22 Prob OR .006 .006 .006 .005 .007
ChangeOR –25,063 –22,367 –29,977 –29,977 –22,367
Expected change –376 –336 –420 –330 –380
11 Prob OR .018 .018 .017 .014 .020
ChangeOR –25,027 –22,330 –29,940 –29,940 –22,330
Expected change –1,101 –983 –1,228 –1,048 –1,094
Other Prob OR .088 .087 .084 .075 .094
ChangeOR –35,286 –32,589 –40,199 –40,199 –32,589
Expected change –7,481 –6,876 –8,200 –7,316 –7,430
All Expected change –1,918 –1,743 –2,116 –1,849 –1,907other home. (Recall that the expected change is the probability of a move
times the average change in home equity given a move.) Both HRS and
AHEAD families that move to a new home increase home equity, on aver-
age. The second column is the expected reduction in the home equity of
households that discontinue ownership. The reduction is largest among
households experiencing precipitating shocks. The third column—the
sum of the ﬁrst two columns—is the net annual change in home equity.
(Like table 3.13, table 3.14 considers only initial home owners; it does not
account for the increase in the home equity that occurs when initial renters
buy a home.)
On average, HRS households increase home equity by $214 per year.
AHEAD households, on average, reduce home equity by $1,519 annually,
which represents an overalldecline of about 1.76 percent of initial home eq-
uity. The percentages in the last column can be used to illustrate the signif-
icance of disruptions to family status among AHEAD households: For ex-
ample, there is almost no decline (–0.11 percent) in the home equity of
continuing two-person households. On average, the initial home equity of
these households is $94,257. Suppose that this is the average home equity
of two-person households at age seventy. At an annual decline of 0.11 per-
cent, the $94,257 would be reduced by only $2,052—to $92,205—by age
ninety. The reduction of continuing one-person households is somewhat
larger. If the average home equity of one-person households is $78,496 at
age seventy, and the annual reduction for one-person households is 1.15
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Table 3.14 Accounting for the Overall Change in Home Equity of Initial
Homeowners in the HRS and the AHEAD
Expected Annual Change in Home Equity
Survey and Move and Discontinue Initial Home % of
Household Purchase Home Equity of Initial
Status New Homea Ownershipb Allc Sellers ($) Equity
HRS
22 815 –379 436 75,128 0.58
11 667 –832 –166 81,105 –0.20
Other 1,078 –1,041 37 79,858 0.05
All 823 –610 214 76,952 0.28
AHEAD
22 275 –376 –101 94,257 –0.11
11 200 –1,101 –901 78,496 –1.15
Other 602 –7,481 –6,879 87,777 –7.84
All 399 –1,918 –1,519 86,445 –1.76
aPr(OmO)   E(DHEOmO)
bPr(OR)   E(DHEOR)
cE(DHEO)percent, the home equity of continuing one-person households would be
reduced by $16,211—to $62,285—by age ninety. Most of the overall re-
duction of 1.76 percent is accounted for by households who experience
precipitating shocks—the “other” group (2N, 2D, or 1N). For these
households, home equity falls by 7.84 percent on an annual basis. If each
year, the equity of households in this group fell at this rate, average equity
of $87,777 at age seventy would be reduced to $17,149 by age ninety. But,
only about 12 percent of households are in this group. Thus the reduction
for all households is much less than this. Even among households in this
group—those experiencing precipitating shocks—only 8.8 percent move
in the survey interval in which the shock occurs, as shown in table 3.13.
This suggests that the decline in housing equity among continuing one-
person households may in part be the delayed consequence of a prior tran-
sition from a two-person household to a one-person household.
Thus, as suggested by the results in prior sections of the paper, the sum-
mary results in table 3.14 show that in the absence of precipitating shocks
there is little systematic reduction in home equity as families age. Families
who move to a new home increase home equity, on average. Reductions in
equity come from families who sell and discontinue home ownership. And
most of these moves are associated with precipitating shocks to family sta-
tus. We ﬁnd no systematic withdrawal of home equity to support non-
housing consumption.
3.3 Conclusions
Home equity is the principle asset of a large fraction of elderly Ameri-
cans. In this paper we have used HRS and AHEAD panel data, as well as
SIPP data, to understand the change in the home equity of households as
they age. We give particular attention to the relationship between changes
in home equity and changes in household structure. There are two ways for
households to change home equity: by discontinuing home ownership or
by selling and moving to another home. We ﬁnd that, overall, households
are unlikely to discontinue home ownership. Ownership terminations are
most likely to occur following the death of a spouse or entry of a family
member into a nursing home. But even in these circumstances, selling the
home is the exception and not the rule. In the absence of a precipitating
shock, it is much more likely that a family will sell and buy a new home than
discontinue ownership. And, households who sell and buy again tend to in-
crease rather than reduce home equity. That is, assets are transferred to
housing.
Overall—combining the eﬀects of discontinuing ownership and moving
to another home—we ﬁnd that housing equity of HRS households in-
creases with age, and the equity of AHEAD households declines some-
what. The overall decline in the housing equity of the older AHEAD
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rily by a 7.84 percent decline among households experiencing precipitat-
ing shocks to family status. Families that remain intact reduce housing eq-
uity very little, only 0.11 percent per year for two-person households and
1.15 percent per year for one-person households.
We use two approaches to determine whether households wish to reduce
home equity as they age. One approach is to compare the change in the
home equity of movers to the change for stayers. If households withdraw
equity when they sell and move to a new home, the reduction in the equity
of the movers will typically be greater than the change for stayers. These
comparisons, however, are confounded by the tendency of the self-assessed
home values to exceed actual values, as measured by selling prices. A com-
parison of the selling prices of homes with the prior self-assessment of
home values shows that home values reported prior to a sale far exceed re-
alized sales prices. Comparing the change in the home equity of movers
and stayers, but accounting for this bias, we conclude that families who sell
and buy a new home increase home equity, on average.
The second approach is based on the comparison of the selling price of
the old home (minus the mortgage on the home) with the reported equity
value in the newly purchased home. We believe that these are the most re-
liable data on the change in home equity when families move from one
home to another. Based on these “sale price” data, we ﬁnd that, on average,
households increase home equity when they move to a new house. We also
ﬁnd, however, that equity-rich and income-poor families tend to reduce
home values when they sell and buy a new house, while equity-poor and in-
come-rich families tend to increase home equity. For continuing two-
person HRS households, for example, we estimate that the between-wave
reduction for those at the 80th equity quantile and at the 20th income
quantile is –$15,422. On the other hand, we estimate that households at the
20th equity quantile and the 80th income quantile increase equity by
 $54,778.
These results suggest that in considering whether families have saved
enough to maintain their preretirement standard of living after retirement,
housing equity should not, in general, be counted on to support nonhous-
ing consumption. Families apparently do not intend to ﬁnance general re-
tirement consumption by saving through investment in housing, as they
might through a 401(k) plan or through some other ﬁnancial form of sav-
ing. Rather, we believe the ﬁndings here, as well as our earlier ﬁndings, sug-
gest that families purchase homes to provide an environment in which to
live, even as they age through retirement years. In this case, the typical ag-
ing household is unlikely to seek a reverse annuity mortgage to withdraw
assets from home equity. It may be appropriate, however, to think of hous-
ing as a reserve or buﬀer that can be used in catastrophic circumstances
that result in a change in household structure. In this case, having used the
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would defeat the purpose of saving home equity for a rainy day.
Although these results are based largely on new HRS and AHEAD data
ﬁles, and are based on diﬀerent methods of analysis, the ﬁndings corre-
spond closely to the conclusions we reached in our earlier papers, based on
diﬀerent data sources. These conclusions also correspond closely to the
ﬁndings of a recent survey of older households sponsored by the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP; 2000, 24), showing that the pre-
ponderance of older families agree with the statement: “What I’d really like
to do is stay in my current residence as long as possible’.”15 Like our ﬁnd-
ings, the results of the AARP survey also imply that most households do
not intend to liquidate housing equity to support general nonhousing re-
tirement consumption as they age.
Appendix
Mortality Correction
The analyses using the SIPP data are based on cohorts constructed from
cross-section surveys. For example, the home ownership (or home equity)
proﬁle for a cohort is constructed by combining data for all households
aged A in the ﬁrst survey year with data for households aged A   T from a
survey T years later. If the likelihood of survival from A to A   T is related
to wealth, then these cohort proﬁles can be aﬀected by diﬀerential mortal-
ity. We correct for this problem by reweighting the sample. Households are
assigned an adjusted weight that is inversely related to the probability of
survival from age A to age A   T.
Baseline estimates of these survival probabilities for one- and two-
person households are obtained from waves 1 and 2 of AHEAD. A one-
person household survives if the person is present in waves 1 and 2. A two-
person household survives if both members are present in the second wave.
Survival probabilities are estimated from the AHEAD for ﬁve year age in-
tervals and for housing equity quartiles. Households that are older and
households that have lower levels of housing wealth are less likely to sur-
vive. Since the AHEAD only includes households aged seventy and over,
published survival rates by age (from the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics [NCHS]) were used to extrapolate the AHEAD survival probabili-
ties back to age ﬁfty.
The ﬁnal step is to reweight the data. For each household observation of
age A and housing equity quartile Q, the SIPP frequency weight is multi-
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15. More detail is presented in Venti and Wise (2001).plied by the inverse of the cumulative survival probability. The survival
probabilities are assumed to be one for households less than age ﬁfty. Thus
households that are unlikely to survive are given higher weights. For each
observation the probability of surviving to age A given equity quartile Q is
(6) S(A, Q)   
A
a 50
s(a, a   1: Q),
where s(a, a   1: Q) is the one-year survival rate for a household in equity
quartile Q. For each household in each year the SIPP frequency weight is
multiplied by the inverse of S(A, Q).
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Table 3A.1 Probit Estimates of Move Probabilities and Quantiles Used to Simulate
Move Probabilities
Buy Another Home Discontinue Ownership
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
HRS Households
1 to 1 –0.256 –3.24 –0.007 0.06
2 to 2 –0.194 –2.64 –0.303 2.71
Equity 0.001 0.37 –0.006 3.22
Income 0.008 4.09 –0.020 2.66
Equity   Income –0.000 –1.59 0.000 0.37
Constant –1.354 –18.92 –1.808 16.81
Income ($) Equity ($)




Buy Another Home Discontinue Ownership
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
AHEAD Households
1 to 1 –0.113 1.34 –0.907 13.57
2 to 2 –0.175 1.99 –1.367 15.47
Equity 0.009 3.24 –0.004 0.74
Income 0.014 1.87 –0.024 1.09
Equity   Income –0.000 2.27 –0.001 0.61
Constant –1.699 20.83 –0.701 8.89
Income ($) Equity ($)
Selected Quantiles of Income and Initial Reported Home Equity
20th 10,909 37,434
50th 21,433 74,869
80th 40,609 139,042Table 3A.2 OLS and Median Regression Estimates of the Change in Home Equity
and Quantiles Used to Simulate Changes in Home Equity for
Households Purchasing Another Home
OLS Median Regression
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
HRS Households
1 to 1 48.4 0.00 –762.6 0.08
2 to 2 2,134.4 0.16 9,765.2 1.04
Equity –5,315.7 10.91 –4,798.4 8.53
Income 2,593.1 4.40 2,024.1 2.33
Equity   Income 10.5 1.20 18.4 0.57
Constant 47,719.4 3.64 25,646.6 2.60
Income ($) Equity ($)





Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
AHEAD Households
1 to 1 –15,713.5 0.49 –20,551.8 0.80
2 to 2 –8,999.6 0.29 231.9 0.01
Equity –6,234.6 5.21 –7,619.1 4.56
Income 5,998.9 1.83 2,289.0 0.60
Equity   Income 37.5 0.36 141.5 0.64
Constant 60,189.0 1.82 54,972.1 1.77
Income ($) Equity ($)
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Table 3A.3 OLS and Median Regression Estimates of the Change in Home Equity
and Quantiles Used to Simulate Changes in Home Equity for
Households Not Purchasing Another Home
OLS Median Regression
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
HRS Households
1 to 1 13,084.3 0.86 10,552.8 0.48
2 to 2 18,754.4 1.37 18,635.4 0.85
Equity 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
Income –1,791.8 2.40 –2,063.0 1.46
Equity   Income 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
Constant –69,374.6 5.16 –51,943.1 2.63
Income ($) Equity ($)





Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
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Income ($) Equity ($)
Selected Quantiles of Income and Initial Reported Home Equity
20th 10,909 37,434
50th 21,433 74,869
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A little more than a decade ago, Venti and Wise dropped an empirical
spanner into the machinery of the life-cycle model when they showed that
the elderly were as likely to move into a larger house as into a smaller one
(Venti and Wise 1989). This puzzling result had been suggested in earlier
work (Merrill 1984), and Feinstein and McFadden (1989) similarly demon-
strated the remarkable resilience of elderly households to ﬁnancial down-
sizing. The Venti and Wise analysis, however, harnessed the panel charac-
teristics of the Retirement History Survey (RHS) to show how robust and
pervasive was this ﬁnding. The problem for the conventional life-cycle
model was that households are supposed to be spending down their accu-
mulated assets as they get older, so as to insure leaving little or nothing
when they ﬁnally arrive at their terminal (T) year. Because so much of a
typical household’s assets comprise housing equity, and presumably fami-
lies are smaller during retirement, the implication of the life-cycle model is
to reduce housing consumption, not increase it. How dare these elderly
people ﬂout the life-cycle model by moving into bigger houses?
Sheiner and Weil (1992) seemed to provide some reassurance to the con-
ventional life-cycle contingent because they noted that for the older old,
that is, people in their eighties and beyond, there was noticeable downsiz-
ing of housing, often as a result of widowhood or serious illness. While
these ﬁndings represented an important step forward, the estimates had
wide conﬁdence intervals given the small sample size available to the re-
searchers.
Venti and Wise have returned to the earlier fertile ground, only this time
they have come armed with much better data from the HRS and AHEAD
on housing choices among the oldest old as well as the younger old. Sur-
prisingly, they continue to ﬁnd that the elderly are not anxious to downsize
even at much older ages, aside from serious transitional changes such as ill-
ness or death of a spouse. Their results are not inconsistent with Sheiner
and Weil (1992), of course; there are many more of these transitional events
for the oldest old, so the overall degree of downsizing tends to be larger for
this older group.
The data analysis is careful and extensive, and I have little to quibble
about with regard to their analysis. Instead, in these comments I will sug-
gest how their results may be interpreted, and what variants of the life-cycle
model ﬁt neatly with their empirical ﬁndings and which ones do not.
There are two somewhat separate issues regarding housing of the elderly.
The ﬁrst is why the elderly do not appear to want to move, particularly
when their house is large relative to the size of the household (one or two
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search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.people, typically), and downsizing would free up substantial levels of eq-
uity. The second is why the elderly, when they do move, are as likely to move
to a larger house as a smaller house. We consider each question in turn.
First, a deep-rooted attachment to one’s house (and presumably neigh-
borhood) is a very common reason given for not wanting to move. In a
study of one focus group with elderly participants, Curry, Gruman, and
Robinson (2001, 39) reported statements showing a strong interest in stay-
ing in one’s house: “First and foremost, you don’t want to give up your
home . . . That’s a big thing—giving up your home” or “I think the home
should be kept sacred.” Indeed, one participant made a point of ﬁghting
against the urge to stay in one’s house: “That sentimental attachment to
your home and things that are customary is one of the chronic aﬄictions
of older age and has to be overcome.”
This may have as much to do with psychological factors as with an im-
plicit understanding of the fact that housing provides a hedge against fu-
ture changes in housing prices. Second, cashing out the house and enter-
ing the rental market exposes the elderly household to rent hikes that are
diﬃcult, if not impossible, to insure against short of home ownership. Sinai
and Souleles (2001), for example, suggest that in areas with greater varia-
tion in rental price changes, home ownership rates are higher. While Sinai
and Souleles point out that the eﬀects of rental variability should be
blunted for the elderly, because their horizon tends to be shorter, the larger
share of rents in the budgets of the elderly would only serve to strengthen
this desire to avoid risk. (A similar story is told for younger households in
Banks, Blundell, and Smith [chap. 5 in this vol.] who seek to purchase a
house earlier to guard against the risk of future home price increases.) In
short, there are very good reasons for elderly homeowners to not sell their
houses for both psychological and economic reasons.
Why, then, are elderly people as likely to move into a more costly house
as to move into a less costly one? It is important to distinguish between
quantity and price here, because it may be the case that the houses they
move into are smaller, but cost more. A study by Choi (1996) sheds some
light on the motivation for moving among the elderly. Figure 3C.1displays
the primary reasons for moving. The most common reason is poor health,
and here presumably downsizing does take place, as is suggested in the
Venti and Wise analysis that ﬁnds poor health is a common cause for get-
ting out of home ownership altogether. But the second most common rea-
son is to move closer to family. Buying a new house or condominium near
one’s children can involve spending more for housing, particularly with re-
gard to moving closer to suburban areas. With regard to reasons for mov-
ing, “amenities” is not far behind; this includes migration to retirement
communities, again which may entail large up-front equity costs.
A fourth reason for not downsizing (both with regard to existing homes
and new homes) is that the house provides a “safe haven” for assets with
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programs. While states diﬀer with regard to their treatment of home equity,
often equity is not included (either on a de facto or de jure basis) in the as-
set limits used to determine eligibility for Medicaid or Supplemental Social
Insurance (SSI). Selling the house and using the resulting interest to pay
rent would expose the household to the stringent wealth limitations in the
event that a long nursing home stay or chronic illness qualiﬁes them for
welfare or Medicaid.
These reasons for holding on to housing wealth are all perfectly consis-
tent with the life-cycle model, albeit one with a few more bells and whistles
than the usual perfect certainty model. Housing wealth should be viewed
as a particularly valuable insurance for an elderly household (Skinner
1996). In the “good” state of the world, there are no debilitating health or
ﬁnancial downturns, and the elderly can continue to live in their house un-
til death, upon which the house and remaining assets are bequeathed to
family members or other worthy recipients. It is important to note, how-
ever, that in these “good” states of the world, elderly households do not
downsize, so in that sense, the simplest life-cycle model, in which house-
holds spend down their wealth (both housing and nonhousing) to ﬁnance
consumption retirement, is simply incorrect.
In the “bad” state of the world, one or more of the spouses qualiﬁes for
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Fig. 3C.1 Reasons given for moving among elderly
Source: Choi (1996)
Notes: Poor health includes health of sample person or spouse, or death/institutionalization
of spouse. Amenities includes moving to a retirement/community home.Medicaid or another social insurance program with wealth limitations,
and while nonhousing assets are depleted under the asset means testing,
housing equity is largely preserved, either for the beneﬁt of the healthy
spouse or those receiving the bequest. Finally, in the “really bad” state of
the world, poor health or adverse ﬁnancial outcomes results leads to sell-
ing the house and moving to a rental or an institutional setting. In this case,
the cash is welcome to provide for amenities or a preferred nursing home
at the same time that the house no longer remains a viable option for the
elderly person; thus the house provides a well-balanced insurance “asset”
(Skinner 1996).
This view of the world is one in which assets, including housing assets,
are held against future contingencies in later life, so in that sense it can be
viewed as a life-cycle model. On the other hand, in the good and bad state
of the world, when the assets are not needed directly for very bad adverse
outcomes, the household members are happy to pass along a bequest. Only
in the “very bad” state of the world are assets largely depleted with regard
to bequests.
This approach also makes sense of a seeming paradox in the Survey of
Consumer Finances. When asked about why they are saving, more than 40
percent of retirees respond that they are saving against a “rainy day” or
emergencies, with only about one-tenth percent responding that they are
saving for their children. Yet when asked about bequests, roughly half of
all respondents view leaving a ﬁnancial bequest as “important” or “very
important” (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 2002). In other words, one need
not choose between a “bequest motive” and a “life-cycle motive” for sav-
ing; assets such as housing serve both objectives simultaneously on an ex
ante basis.
In sum, there is good news and bad news for fans of the conventional life-
cycle model. The good news for the fans is that the oldest old do indeed
tend to deaccumulate their housing assets. At ﬁrst blush, this may suggest
that the conventional life-cycle model had it right all along. However, the
bad news is that, as Venti and Wise demonstrate, the conventional life-
cycle model entirely misses the motives for why households are deaccumu-
lating. The motives for why the elderly hold on to housing for so long, and
the importance of health-related shocks that cause the elderly to reduce
housing equity, should be the major focus of an expanded life-cycle model.
While the Venti and Wise study has provided many pieces of the puzzle,
there are still many pieces missing. While I have suggested some reasons
why the elderly may wish to purchase more expensive housing, it is not
clear why the median should still be essentially no decline in housing value.
Are there that many elderly people moving to more expensive or larger
houses? What do we know about the characteristics of the houses the el-
derly are moving into? Are they really larger or just more expensive? Given
Aging and Housing Equity: Another Look 179the long-term importance of housing wealth in the portfolio of the elderly,
it would seem that these questions will only become more important in the
next several decades as the baby boom generation gears up for retirement.
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